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I. INTRODUCTION 
In May 2010, Tara Elonis left her husband, Anthony Elonis.1  
Several months later, he directed a series of threatening posts on his 
Facebook page to her, writing, “If I only knew then what I know now . . .  
I would have smothered your ass with a pillow.  Dumped your body in 
the back seat.  Dropped you off in Toad Creek and made it look like rape 
and murder.”2  In another post, Elonis wrote, “[T]here’s one way to love 
ya but a thousand ways to kill ya, And I’m not gonna rest until your body 
is a mess, Soaked in blood and dying from all the little cuts, Hurry up and 
die bitch . . . .”3  Fearful of these threatening messages, Tara filed for and 
was granted a Protection from Abuse order (“PFA”) for herself and her 
children.4 
Despite the PFA, Elonis continued to threaten Tara online by posting 
messages on his Facebook page.  In one such message, he posted a script 
of a comedy sketch that mocked the idea that it is illegal to discuss 
wanting to kill the president and how one could actually kill the 
president.5  However, in posting the script on Facebook, Elonis replaced 
the word “president” and details of the White House with his wife’s name 
and details of her home, and described how he would murder her.6  In a 
later post, Elonis wrote, “Fold up your [protection-from-abuse order] and 
put it in your pocket, is it thick enough to stop a bullet?”7 
The threats directed towards Tara were frightening, causing the 
F.B.I. to later intervene.8  A lawsuit was brought against Elonis, charging 
him with violating 18 U.S.C. § 875(c),  the federal threat statute, which 
makes it a crime to transmit a threat through interstate communications.9  
Elonis’s case eventually made its way up to the Supreme Court.10  Prior 
to the Court’s ruling, nine circuits had adopted an objective intent 
standard for interpreting § 875(c), holding that criminal liability attaches 
if a reasonable person would have perceived the communication as a 
 
 1  Brief for Appellee at 10, United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 12-
3798), rev’d and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). 
 2  Id. 
 3  Id. at 11. 
 4  Id. at 11-12. 
 5  Kamatzu, Whitest Kids U Know: It’s Illegal to Say. . ., YOUTUBE (May 2, 2007), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QEQOvyGbBtY. 
 6  Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2005-06 (2015). 
 7  Id. 
 8  Included in Elonis’ Facebook posts were also threats to injure “patrons and employees 
of the [amusement] park [where Elonis had previously worked], . . . police officers, a 
kindergarten class and an FBI agent.”  Id. 
 9  Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2002; 18 U.S.C. § 875 (2016). 
 10  Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2001. 
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threat.11  However, the Supreme Court disagreed and held that the 
objective intent standard was essentially a negligence standard, and that 
mere negligence on the part of the offender was not sufficient for a 
conviction under § 875(c).12  While purposefully or knowingly 
communicating a threat would warrant conviction, the Court declined to 
decide whether recklessness on the part of the offender would be enough 
for conviction.13 
Tara Elonis is not alone in facing online threats.  In fact, a Pew 
Research Center study found that young women ages eighteen to twenty-
four are the most likely of all Internet users to experience severe forms of 
online harassment including online stalking, sexual harassment, and 
physical threats.14  As a result, women on the Internet are becoming 
increasingly vulnerable to situations in which they are the target of threats 
of sexual and physical violence.  In her e-book, Targeted and Trolled: 
The Reality of Being a Woman Online, Rossalyn Warren commented, 
[O]nline abuse of women is not confined to sexual 
harassment and stalking.  How many times have you . . . 
heard about a woman being sent a rape threat on social 
media . . . This type of abuse has become so woven into the 
fabric of the Internet that it’s hard to imagine the Internet 
without it.15 
One such example is what happened to Zoe Quinn, a video game 
designer.  After she broke up with her boyfriend, he posted an article 
describing her sex life in an effort to ruin her reputation.16  He then sent 
the article to several website users who had a history of harassing her.17  
As a result, Quinn’s personal information, such as her home address, 
phone number, emails, and nude photos, was widely distributed to these 
users, and she received thousands of death and rape threats.18  Some of 
the threats that she received included, “Next time she shows up at a 
conference we . . . give her a crippling injury that’s never going to fully 
heal . . . a good solid injury to the knees.  I’d say a brain damage, but we 
 
 11  There was no circuit split over the question because most circuits used only the 
objective intent standard, although two outlier circuits required intent to threaten.  Elonis, at 
2018 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 12  Id. at 2013. 
 13  Id. 
 14  Maeve Duggan, Online Harassment, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 4-5 (2014),  
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2014/10/PI_OnlineHarassment_72815.pdf. 
 15  ROSSAYLN WARREN, TARGETED AND TROLLED: THE REALITY OF BEING A WOMAN 
ONLINE 48 (2015) (ebook). 
 16  Zachary Jason, Game of Fear, BOSTON MAGAZINE (May 2015), http://www. 
bostonmagazine.com/news/article/2015/04/28/gamergate. 
 17  Id. 
 18  Id. 
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don’t want to make it so she ends up too retarded to fear us.”19  Another 
threat stated, “Im not only a pedophile, ive raped countless teens, this zoe 
bitch is my next victim, im coming slut.”20  Another threat read, “If I ever 
see you are doing a pannel [sic] at an event I am going to, I will literally 
kill you.  You are lower than shit and deserve to be hurt, maimed, killed, 
and finally, graced with my piss on your rotting corpse a thousand times 
over.”21 
To Quinn, these threats were serious enough to evoke fear that 
caused her to leave her own home.22  To Tara Elonis, the threats were 
enough to cause her to fear for her life, her children’s lives, and the well-
being of her family.23  And they are not alone: other women face threats 
of this magnitude as well; in 2006, the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
estimated that approximately 850,000 people a year experience stalking 
and threats via technology.24  And yet only around twenty-five cases each 
year are pursued under the federal threat statute, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).25 
When fighting online threats, law enforcement officials and 
prosecutors should enforce and utilize the already existing federal threat 
statute, § 875(c), to prosecute online threats.  However, these officials 
must also recognize that these online threats are unique and therefore 
different from traditional offline forms of threats.  In prosecuting online 
threats, the federal threat statute can be strengthened through a 
requirement of a recklessness for conviction.  When litigating these 
crimes, prosecutors and judges should take into account the entirety of 
the circumstances, including the relationship between the victim and the 
individual who is communicating the threat.  In doing so, prosecutors 
would determine whether or not the perpetrator should have been aware 
that the victim would feel threatened, as opposed to whether or not the 
perpetrator actually intended to carry out his or her threat.  A recklessness 
 
 19  Simon Parkin, Zoe Quinn’s Depression Quest, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 9, 2014), 
http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/zoe-quinns-depression-quest/. 
 20  Jason, supra note 16. 
 21  Jason, supra note 16. 
 22  Keith Stuart, Zoe Quinn: ‘All Gamergate has done is Ruin People’s Lives’, THE 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/03/ 
zoe-quinn-gamergate-interview. 
 23  Brief for Appellee at 15, United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2013) (12-
3798), rev’d and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). 
 24  Danielle Citron, United States v. Elonis and the Rarity of Threat Prosecutions, FORBES 
(Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/daniellecitron/2014/12/03/ 
united-states-v-elonis-and-the-rarity-of-threat-prosecutions/; see also Katrina Baum, 
Shannan Catalano & Michael Rand, Stalking Victimization in the United States, U.S. DEP’T. 
OF JUSTICE (Jan. 2009), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ovw/legacy/ 
2012/08/15/bjs-stalking-rpt.pdf. 
 25  Citron, supra note 24. 
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standard would allow for conviction under § 875(c) when the individual 
was aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his words may be 
perceived as threats, and yet this individual consciously disregarded that 
risk.  Requiring recklessness under § 875(c) provides a clearer standard 
for conviction, which will serve to protect more victims of online threats.  
Additionally, a recklessness standard would act as a deterrent for those 
who wish to threaten their victims online.  Because prosecutors and courts 
would be able to evaluate a threat under the entirety of the circumstances, 
perpetrators of online threats would no longer be able to claim that their 
threats are simply innocent words or misunderstandings. 
Section II of this note will discuss the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Elonis v. United States.26  Section III will explain the nature of online 
threats, including how and why online threats differ from traditional 
offline threats.  Section IV will argue that prosecutors should utilize the 
already existing federal threat statute, § 875(c), when prosecuting online 
threats.  Additionally, this section will argue that a mens rea of 
recklessness is necessary in order to strengthen § 875(c) because not only 
will a clearer standard generate more online threat litigation, but it will 
also deter individuals from making online threats.  This section will also 
address several other techniques that are currently being used to fight 
online threats, including the work of non-profit organizations, efforts by 
social networking websites, and proposed legislation in Congress. 
II.  ELONIS V. UNITED STATES 
In Elonis v. United States, Elonis was charged with violating the 
federal threat statute, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), which makes it a crime to 
“transmit[] in interstate . . . commerce any communication containing . . . 
any threat to injure the person of another.”27  One of the many difficulties 
in prosecuting a case under § 875(c) is that the statute does not specify a 
defendant’s required mental state.  The statute itself does not explicitly 
state that a defendant must intend that the transmitted communication 
contain a threat.28  Implicit in this difficulty is whether the First 
Amendment requires a defendant to “be aware of the threatening nature 
of the communication” in order to be convicted of making a true threat, 
which is a threat that is not protected by the First Amendment.29 
At trial, Elonis argued that § 875(c) should be interpreted under a 
subjective intent standard, which would require the government to prove 
 
 26  Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2001 (2015). 
 27  18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2016).  
 28  Id. 
 29  Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2004. 
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that Elonis intended to communicate a threat.30  In contrast, the Court 
instructed the jury to interpret § 875(c) under an objective standard, 
stating, 
A statement is a true threat when a defendant intentionally 
makes a statement in a context or under such circumstances 
wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement 
would be interpreted by those to whom the maker 
communicates the statement as a serious expression of an 
intention to inflict bodily injury or take the life of an 
individual.31 
Elonis was found guilty and sentenced to three years and eight 
months in prison.32  On appeal, the Third Circuit held that § 875(c) should 
be interpreted under an objective intent standard, whereby a threat is 
made willfully when “a reasonable person would foresee that the 
statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker 
communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to 
inflict bodily harm.”33 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Elonis again argued that § 875(c) 
should be interpreted under a subjective intent standard and explained 
that a “conviction of violating § 875(c) requires proof that the defendant 
intended the charged statement to be a ‘threat.”34  Elonis argued that 
without a subjective intent standard, people could be held criminally 
liable for negligent speech.35  In contrast, the government, again, 
advocated for an objective intent or a “reasonable person” standard, 
arguing that a “conviction requires a statement that, to a reasonable 
person, communicates an intent to do harm.”36 
In its decision, the Court explained that § 875(c) does not specify a 
mens rea requirement, but such a requirement must apply to establish the 
fact that a communication contains a threat.37  Moreover, Elonis’s 
 
 30  Id. at 2007. 
 31  Id. 
 32  Id.   
 33  U.S. v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 332 (3d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted), rev’d and 
remanded, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). 
 34  Brief for Petitioner at 29, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983).  
 35  Id. at 20.  Additionally, Elonis raised several First Amendment arguments.  Id.  Elonis 
suggested that a subjective intent standard would not violate the First Amendment, as past 
First Amendment jurisprudence suggests that before imposing criminal liability on speech, 
there must first be a past history and tradition of requiring proof of intent to threaten, or proof 
of prohibited intent before imposing such criminal liability.  Id.  Elonis also argued that a 
negligence standard would “impermissibly chill free speech,” as such a standard is 
unpredictable, given the possibility of discriminating against minority viewpoints, as well as 
criminalizing “misunderstandings.”  Id.  
 36  Brief for the United States at 14, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 
13-983). 
 37  Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2011. 
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conviction was based on how his posts would be understood by a 
reasonable person, and this was “inconsistent with the conventional 
requirement for criminal conduct—awareness of some wrongdoing.”38  
The Court further explained, “Having liability turn on whether a 
‘reasonable person’ regards the communication as a threat—regardless of 
what the defendant thinks—reduces culpability on the all-important 
element of the crime to negligence and we have long been reluctant to 
infer that a negligence standard was intended in criminal statutes.”39  The 
Court held that the government’s objective intent standard was essentially 
a negligence standard and that “negligence is not sufficient to support a 
conviction under Section 875(c).”40  The Court noted that the mens rea 
requirement would be satisfied if a defendant either transmitted a 
communication with the purpose of transmitting a threat or if the 
defendant knew that the communication would be viewed as a threat.41  
The Supreme Court, however, declined to determine whether 
recklessness would be sufficient for criminal liability under § 875(c) 
since there was no circuit conflict over the recklessness question and it 
was not sufficiently briefed or argued by Elonis or the government.42 
The Court’s decision leaves many questions unanswered.  Justice 
Alito expressed frustration with the Court’s decision in a concurring 
opinion wherein he asked, “Would recklessness suffice?  The Court 
declines to say.  Attorneys and judges are left to guess.”43  Justice Alito 
also noted that the decision would have “regrettable consequences” 
because “[i]f purpose or knowledge is needed and a district court instructs 
the jury that recklessness suffices, a defendant may be wrongly convicted.  
On the other hand, if recklessness is enough, and the jury is told that 
conviction requires proof of more, a guilty defendant may go free.”44 
For Justice Alito, a finding of recklessness would have been 
sufficient for conviction under § 875(c).  He agreed that there needed to 
be more than mere negligence for conviction, but once past the 
negligence threshold, recklessness sufficed.45  A recklessness standard is 
not necessarily an objective standard because “[s]someone who acts 
recklessly with respect to conveying a threat necessarily grasps that he is 
not engaged in innocent conduct.  He is not merely careless.  He is aware 
 
 38  Id. 
 39  Id. 
 40  Id. at 2013. 
 41  Id. at 2012.   
 42  Id. at 2013.  
 43  Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2014 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 44  Id.  
 45  Id. at 2015. 
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that others could regard his statements as a threat, but he delivers them 
anyway.”46 
III. ONLINE THREATS 
In the wake of the Elonis decision, courts must now decide whether 
to require a mens rea of recklessness under § 875(c).  As such, it is helpful 
to consider the definition of a true threat and the limits of First 
Amendment protection over threatening speech.  While there is no clear 
definition of what constitutes a true threat, Justice Thomas, in his Elonis 
dissent, explained the Court’s past jurisprudence on the subject, noting 
that a threat is a “serious expression of an intention to commit unlawful 
physical violence . . . it also cannot be determined solely by the reaction 
of the recipient, but must instead be ‘determined by the interpretation of 
a reasonable recipient familiar with the context of the communication.’”47  
Moreover, Justice Thomas stipulated that “the communication must be 
one that a ‘reasonable observer would construe as a true threat to 
another.’”48 
While the Court has not defined what constitutes a threat, “in 
construing the same term in a related statute” the Court “distinguished a 
‘true “threat”‘ from facetious or hyperbolic remarks.”49  The Court first 
discussed threats in Watts v. United States, where Watts, while discussing 
his draft classification at a public rally, stated, “If they ever make me 
carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.”50  Based on 
this statement, Watts was convicted of committing a felony by 
“knowingly and willfully threatening the President.”51  The Supreme 
Court reversed the lower court’s decision and explained that “[w]hat is a 
threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected 
speech.”52  Here, Watts had been engaged in “political hyperbole” by 
stating his opposition to the President.53  The Court distinguished a true 
threat from “uninhibited, robust, and wide open . . . vehement, caustic 
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks.”54 
The Court has since consistently held that true threats, like other 
 
 46  Id. 
 47  See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2019 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Darby, 
37 F.3d 1059, 1066 (C.A. 1994)). 
 48  See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 478 
(C.A. 2012)). 
 49  Id.; see also Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969). 
 50  Watts, 394 U.S. at 705-06. 
 51  Id.  
 52  Id. at 707. 
 53  Id. at 707-08. 
 54  Id. at 708. 
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content-based restrictions, are not protected by the First Amendment.55  
In Virginia v. Black, the Court further discussed the concept of a “true 
threat” and suggested that the speaker of the threat does not “actually 
need to intend to carry out the threat.”56 
A. Punishment of Threats 
Imagine the following scenario: someone calls a parent of a school-
aged child on the telephone and informs the parent of plans to blow up 
the child’s school.  Sherry F. Colb said that in such a situation, a parent 
would likely be very frightened and would not want to send his or her 
child to school that day.57  The school would probably close for the day 
to investigate.58  That investigation would likely involve police and the 
use of a bomb squad.59  Colb explained, “All of these effects are very 
destructive and an unacceptable price to pay for the caller’s exercise of 
his freedom to call [you] and utter the words, ‘I am blowing up your 
child’s school today.’”60 
In Virginia v. Black, the Court explained that prohibiting threats 
“protects individuals from the fear of violence” and “from the disruption 
that fear engenders” in addition to “protecting from the possibility that 
the threatened violence will occur.”61  It is clear that threats result in a 
wide variety of detrimental and sometimes deadly effects for the 
individual who is receiving the threat, and they also create high costs for 
society.  For the individual, these effects are economic, emotional, 
psychological, or even physical, including “nightmares, heart problems, 
inability to work, loss of appetite and insomnia.”62  For example, in 
Tompkins v. Cyr, Dr. Tompkins and his wife were the victims of 
anonymous callers and anonymous letters that threatened their lives 
 
 55  See Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 
290 F.3d 1058, 1070 (9th Cir. 2002), as amended (July 10, 2002); see also U.S. v. Alvarez, 
132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (outlining several content-based restrictions on speech, 
including “advocacy intended, and likely, to incite imminent lawless action,” obscenity, 
defamation, speech integral to criminal conduct, “so-called ‘fighting words,’” child 
pornography, fraud, and “speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the government 
has the power to prevent”). 
 56  Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003). 
 57  Sherry F. Colb, The Supreme Court Considers “True Threats” and the First 
Amendment, VERDICT (Dec. 10, 2014), https://verdict.justia.com/2014/12/10/supreme-court-
considers-true-threats-first-amendment. 
 58  Id. 
 59  Id. 
 60  Colb, supra note 57. 
 61  Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003). 
 62  Jennifer Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
283, 291 (2001). 
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because Dr. Tompkins was a doctor who performed abortions.63  For the 
Tomkins, the threats resulted in “reactions of fear, stress, anxiety, 
depression, and sadness,” as well as problems with sleeping and eating.64  
Eventually the family hired a bodyguard, began wearing  bulletproof 
vests, and moved Dr. Tompkins’s medical practice to another city.65 
Similarly, in Simpson v. Burrows, after Jo Ann Simpson and her 
partner opened a lodge and restaurant, they began receiving letters 
targeting them because they were lesbians.66  The letters threatened their 
lives while calling them “abominations” that brought immoral and 
unfavorable elements into the community.67  Simpson explained the 
effect the letters had on her life, explaining that her girlfriend had left her 
and she had to buy a gun because she feared for her life.68  As a result of 
the letters, she had trouble sleeping and had occasional nightmares.69  She 
also stated that she “suffered various physical problems including upset 
stomach, headaches, and crying jags.”70  Finally, Simpson explained that 
she lost her trust in people.71 
The effects of these threats on Simpson’s and the Tompkins’ 
personal lives were severe.  Whether or not the anonymous stalkers 
actually intended that their victims felt threatened had no bearing on 
Simpson’s and the Tompkins’ fears or how they dealt with these threats.  
Both sets of victims describe the physical effect the threats had on them, 
including suffering from manifestations of the fear through insomnia, 
headaches, and nausea.72  The fear also manifested itself psychologically 
and emotionally; the victims both describe suffering from anxiety, 
depression, and general feelings of sadness as a result of the threats.73  
Additionally, the threats had a severe economic impact on both Simpson 
and the Tompkins as both had to find ways to protect themselves by either 
purchasing guns, wearing bulletproof vests, or even hiring bodyguards.  
In the end, both had to move away, physically leaving their homes.74 
The reactions of the Tompkins and Simpson are common; in its 
 
 63  Tompkins v. Cyr, 202 F.3d 770, 776 (5th Cir. 2000).   
 64  Id. at 782. 
 65  Id. at 777. 
 66  Simpson v. Burrows, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1118 (D. Or. 2000). 
 67  Id. 
 68  Id. at 1121. 
 69  Id. 
 70  Id. 
 71  Id.  
 72  See generally Simpson v. Burrows, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (D. Or. 2000); Tompkins v. 
Cyr, 202 F.3d 770 (5th Cir. 2000).   
 73  See generally, supra note 72. 
 74  See generally, supra note 72. 
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survey of online harassment, the Pew Research Center estimated that 
around twenty-seven percent of people who had been threatened or 
severely harassed online in the past found it very or extremely upsetting.75  
Severe online harassment includes physical threats, sexual harassment, 
stalking, or harassment over a sustained period of time, while mild or less 
severe online harassment includes actions such as name-calling or 
embarrassment.76  The Pew Research Study found that while men and 
women are equally likely to have experienced some sort of severe 
harassment, the reactions of men and women differed.77  Men are more 
likely to experience more mild or less severe types of online harassment 
in the form of name-calling and embarrassment while women are more 
likely to experience severe forms of online harassment.78 
There are many reasons for the disparate reactions of men and 
women to online harassment and threats.  One explanation may be the 
different platforms where men and women experience the threats and 
harassment.  Young men explain that they often experience online 
harassment within online gaming websites.79  In contrast, women note 
that social networking websites and mobile applications are often where 
they are harassed or threatened.80  A person’s online presence on social 
media is often a reflection of their offline reality and personal life.  
However, gaming websites take place in a virtual reality where it is easy 
to distinguish the line where reality ends and fiction begins.  Perhaps this 
difference is why women experience more severe reactions to online 
threats and harassment as compared to men—it is much more difficult 
outside of online gaming websites to distinguish which threats are real.  
In fact, Pew found that around fifty-one percent of women who have 
“experienced severe harassment online found their most recent incident 
‘extremely’ or ‘very’ upsetting.”81  Those who are victims of online 
threats suffer from the disruption that fear engenders, and that very 
disruption has a significant impact on victims’ lives.  As such, a requisite 
mens rea of recklessness to convict under § 875(c) is necessary to protect 
victims from these online threats.  A recklessness standard will serve as 
a powerful deterrent to perpetrators of online threats and as a necessary 
tool to ensure convictions under the federal threat statute. 
 
 75  Duggan, supra note 14, at 32.  
 76  Duggan, supra note 14, at 13. 
 77  Duggan, supra note 14, at 13. 
 78  Duggan, supra note 14, at 13. 
 79  Duggan, supra note 14, at 6, 25. 
 80  Duggan, supra note 14, at 25. 
 81  Duggan, supra note 14, at 33. 
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B. Threats and the Internet 
Threats and stalking are often inextricably linked. A victim of one 
is often a victim of both because threats are often included in stalking 
behavior.82  When the Internet is used to communicate threats and 
stalking behavior against a victim, the victim suffers in ways that she may 
not have if the stalking and threats had been made offline.  Requiring 
prosecutors to show recklessness by an individual who is making a threat 
is particularly important in the context of cyberstalking and internet-
based threats because of the inherent differences in how these crimes are 
experienced by online victims as opposed to traditional offline threat 
victims. 
Since its inception, the Internet has been utilized as a tool to commit 
crime.83  Many people have used the Internet as a means to further extend 
the reach of their offline criminal behavior.  Stalking is one type of 
criminal behavior that is now easier to commit through the Internet.84  The 
Department of Justice defines stalking as “a pattern of repeated and 
unwanted attention, harassment, contact, or any other course of conduct 
directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to feel 
fear.”85  Traditional notions of stalking include: repeated, unwanted, 
intrusive, and frightening communications from the perpetrator, leaving 
or sending the victim unwanted items such as presents or flowers, making 
direct or indirect threats to harm the victim, damaging or threatening to 
damage the victim’s property, or following the victim.86  Today, the 
Department of Justice also includes in its stalking definition repeated, 
unwanted or intrusive communications over the phone or email, as well 
as posting information or spreading rumors about the victim over the 
Internet.87 
In fact, online stalking through technology and online threats often 
differ greatly from traditional offline stalking and offline threats.  Naomi 
Harlin Goodno, Assistant Professor of Law at Pepperdine University, 
outlined several aspects in which the use of technology to stalk and 
 
 82  See Stalking, THE DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/ovw/stalking (last 
updated Jan. 6, 2016) [hereinafter Stalking].  
 83  See generally Randy James, Cyber Crime, TIME (June 1, 2009), 
 http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1902073,00.html (outlining the history of 
crimes perpetuated online). 
 84  Hi-Tech Stalking, NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2009), 
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/51dc541ce4b03ebab8c5c88c/t/54e3d1b6e4b08500fcb4
55a0/1424216502058/NNEDV_Glimpse+From+the+Field+-+2014.pdf. 
 85  Stalking, supra note 82.  
 86  Stalking, supra note 82. 
 87  Stalking, supra note 82. 
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traditional offline stalking are different.88  The first is that when a 
message is posted online, it is reviewed by a larger audience than if the 
same message was spoken directly to an individual.89  Goodno explains 
that “content can be widely distributed to a larger, more public forum 
than any conventional form of offline stalking and it can be done so 
inexpensively and efficiently.”90  Goodno points to online forums, chat 
rooms, and message boards, which have the potential for thousands of 
people to view a single threat.91  Threats posted on these forums may 
make a single threat against a victim more serious and severe.  Rather 
than only the intended target viewing the threat, more people can view 
the harassment or threat and may be able to encourage others to 
participate or join in the stalking and harassment of the victim.  Goodno 
explains, “[P]erhaps most frightening, and unique to cyberstalking, is that 
cyberstalkers can incite other ‘innocent’ third parties to do their stalking 
for them.”92  What may begin as a single harassing communication may 
snowball into threats and stalking from an entire online community.93 
Take, for example, the women who received death threats after 
posting on social media about the “GamerGate” controversy.94  As a 
result, the threats and stalking directed to the women involved were 
“more intense, invigorated by the anonymity of social media and bulletin 
boards where groups go to cheer each other on and hatch plans for 
 
 88  See generally Naomi Harlin Goodno, Cyberstalking, A New Crime: Evaluating the 
Effectiveness of Current State and Federal Laws, 72 MO. L. REV. 125, 128 (2007).  This note 
will describe “cyber-stalking” as “the use of technology to stalk” or “online stalking.”  See 
From the Desk of the Director: Eliminating “Cyber-Confusion”, NAT’L NETWORK TO END 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2003), https://victimsofcrime.org/docs/src/eliminating-cyber-
confusion.pdf?sfvrsn=2. 
 89  Goodno, supra note 88, at 128. 
 90  Goodno, supra note 88, at 128. 
 91  Goodno, supra note 88, at 128. 
 92  Goodno, supra note 88, at 132. 
 93  See Scott Hammack, The Internet Loophole: Why Threatening Speech On-Line 
Requires a Modification of the Courts’ Approach to True Threats and Incitement, 36 COLUM. 
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 65, 81-86 (2002) (explaining that the internet allows “like-minded” people 
to socialize and develop friendships, and “this newfound social structure provides 
encouragement to perform violent actions, mostly by making their beliefs seem more socially 
acceptable”). 
 94  GamerGate is a “campaign to discredit or intimidate outspoken critics of the male-
dominated gaming industry and its culture.”  The name “GamerGate” was “adopted by those 
who see ethical problems among game journalists and political correctness in their coverage.  
As a result of GamerGate, many critics of the gaming industry were threatened, however the 
more extreme threats. . . seem to be the work of a much smaller faction and aimed at women.”  
Nick Wingfield, Feminist Critics of Video Games Facing Threats in ‘GamerGate’ Campaign, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/16/technology/gamergate-
women-video-game-threats-anita-sarkeesian.html?_r=0. 
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action.”95  Moreover, compared to traditional means of stalking and 
communication of threats, such as letters or phone calls, the use of 
technology to stalk is instantaneous and remains visible online long after 
the victim first views the posting or email, allowing for revictimization 
every time the victim logs online. 
Another way that online stalking and online threats differ from 
traditional offline stalking is that in the former, perpetrators are able to 
utilize the Internet to harass and stalk their victims and communicate 
threats to their victims from anywhere around the world with 
expediency.96  Goodno explains the practical reality that victims face 
because “[t]he uncertainty of the cyberstalker’s location can leave the 
victim in a state of constant panic as she is left wondering whether her 
stalker is in a neighboring house or a neighboring state.”97  While this is 
similar to traditional stalking in the sense that a stalker may contact a 
victim from anywhere around the world, the Internet provides “cyber 
stalkers a cheap and easy way to continue to contact their victim from 
anywhere in the world.”98  The fast-paced reality of the Internet allows 
stalkers to post threats and frightening messages with the simple click of 
a button.99  Stalkers no longer need to wait for a victim to answer the 
phone or for a letter to be delivered for the stalking and the threat to be 
communicated.  The Internet facilitates the delivery of threatening 
communications to stalking victims. 
Next, online stalking and online threats are distinguishable from 
traditional offline stalking and threats in that those who use technology 
to stalk may remain truly anonymous.100  Though stalkers can remain 
anonymous through traditional stalking, the Internet is often easily 
accessible and is associated with anonymity.  Individuals who may never 
have communicated threats or stalked a victim in person can more easily 
“overcome any hesitation, unwillingness, or inabilities he may encounter 
when confronting a victim in person.”101  Moreover, when the perpetrator 
remains anonymous, the victim is unable to assess the veracity of the 
 
 95  Id. 
 96  Goodno, supra note 88, at 129 (“Cyberstalkers can be physically far removed from 
their victim.”). 
 97  Goodno, supra note 88, at 129. 
 98  Goodno, supra note 88, at 129-30. 
 99  See Hammack, supra note 93, at 81-86 (“[T]he relative low-tech nature of pre-Internet 
communication allowed longer periods of time between the generation of a thought and one’s 
ability to share it with others.  This delay provided more time for deliberation and self-
restraint.  Now, in a fit of rage people can email or post a threat, that with even a moment’s 
reflection they otherwise would not have.”). 
 100  Goodno, supra note 88, at 130-31. 
 101  Goodno, supra note 88, at 130-31. 
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stalkers threats, thus contributing to the fear of the victim.  Brianna Wu, 
a woman targeted in the GamerGate controversy explained how this 
affected her: “I woke up twice . . . to noises in the room, gasping with 
fear that someone was there to murder me.  I can barely function without 
fear or jumpiness or hesitation.  I’ve been driven from my home.  My 
husband says he feels like he’s been shot.”102 
Finally, online stalking and online threats differ from their offline 
counterparts due to police response.103  The advent of social media is 
relatively new, and when victims report online stalking and online threats, 
they are often met with officers who are unsure how to respond.104  When 
Amanda Hess, a writer for Slate magazine, informed a police officer that 
someone had threatened to rape and kill her on Twitter, the police officer 
responded, “What’s Twitter?”105  This reaction is not rare, and often 
police do not take reports of online threats seriously because of their very 
nature as threats on the Internet.106  Instead, police are often dismissive 
of these online threats and “tell victims that no one is going to come get 
them.”107 
In 2014, online threats turned into a terrifying reality when a college 
student posted several YouTube videos in which he threatened to harm 
women for rejecting him, stating, 
I am going to enter the hottest sorority house at UCSB and I 
will slaughter every single spoiled, stuck-up, blond slut I see 
inside there . . . I will take great pleasure in slaughtering all 
of you . . . Yes, after I have annihilated every single girl in 
the sorority house, I’ll take to the streets of Isla Vista and slay 
every single person I see there.108 
After the last video was posted, the student acted on those threats, 
first shooting people at a sorority house, and then shooting pedestrians on 
the street.109  After the violence was over, he had killed six people and 
 
 102  Brianna Wu, It Happened to me: I’ve been Forced out of my Home and am Living in 
Constant Fear Because of Relentless Death Threats from Gamergate, XOJANE (Oct. 16, 2014), 
http://www.xojane.com/it-happened-to-me/brianna-wu-gamergate. 
 103  DANIELLE K. CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 84 (2014) [hereinafter “HATE 
CRIMES”]. 
 104  Id. 
 105  Amanda Hess, Why Women Aren’t Welcome on the Internet, PACIFIC STANDARD 
MAGAZINE (Jan. 6, 2014), https://psmag.com/why-women-aren-t-welcome-on-the-internet-
aa21fdbc8d6#.i3a3vwu8z. 
 106  Danielle Citron, Cops Don’t Take Harassment of Women Seriously—Especially 
Online, TIME (Oct. 17, 2014), http://time.com/3513763/anita-sarkeesian-hate-crimes/. 
 107  Id. 
 108  Megan Garvey, Transcript of the Disturbing Video ‘Elliot Rodger’s Retribution’, L.A. 
TIMES (May 24, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-transcript-ucsb-
shootings-video-20140524-story.html. 
 109   Ian Lovett & Adam Nagourney, Video Rant, then Deadly Rampage in California 
Town, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/25/us/california-drive-
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wounded thirteen others.110  However, the shooter’s video warning was 
not the first video that he had uploaded.  In fact, his family had expressed 
their concerns to police regarding several other disturbing videos the 
shooter previously posted on YouTube.111  While police visited the 
shooter in response to his family’s concerns, no other action was taken as 
the police determined that he appeared “polite and courteous.”112  The 
shooter acknowledged, in a written manifesto found after the deadly 
shooting, that had police actually searched his apartment, they would 
have found plans for the massacre and the weapon he would eventually 
use during his killing spree.113 
In her book, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace, Danielle Citron highlights 
the ongoing difficulty of police failing to take these threats seriously.  
Citron notes, “The majority of law enforcement agencies do not 
investigate online stalking complaints because they lack training to 
understand the seriousness of the attacks, the technologies used to 
perpetrate them and the usefulness of existing laws.”114  Often, when 
victims do report these threats to police, instead of receiving help, they 
are told to stop using the Internet or their social networking websites and 
to ignore the online threats or online stalking.115  However, this advice is 
often difficult to follow and fails to appreciate both the necessity of the 
Internet and the seriousness of the threats.  Today, for many people, both 
work and home life are inextricably linked to the Internet, smart phones, 
and social networking websites.  Smart phones have the capability to link 
work and personal email, social networking websites, phone calls, and 
text messaging to a single device.  Pew Research Center estimates that 
around ninety percent of American adults have a cell phone, and around 
 
by-shooting.html. 
 110  Id. 
 111  Antonia Molloy, California Killings: Elliot Rodger’s Family Warned Police about 
Killer’s Disturbing Online Videos Before Shootings and Stabbings, INDEPENDENT (May 25, 
2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/california-killings-elliot-rodger-
was-described-as-polite-and-courteous-during-welfare-check-by-9432530. 
html. 
 112  Id. 
 113  Id. 
 114  HATE CRIMES, supra note 103.  
 115  See WARREN, supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also Citron, supra note 106 
(giving examples of police response to online threats and cyber harassment, ranging from 
advising victims to stay offline and “encourage[ing] victims to ignore the abuse”).  In 2013, 
Jaclyn Munson, a writer for the Daily Beast, received death threats via Twitter and contacted 
the NYPD.  Jaclyn Munson, My Run-In with Anti-Feminist Twitter Death Threats, THE DAILY 
BEAST (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/ 
witw/articles/2013/09/05/my-run-in-with-anti-feminist-twitter-death-threats.html.  Instead of 
helping her, they informed her that “this guy is not perfectly capable of causing serious and 
real harm.”  Id.  
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sixty-four percent of American adults have a smartphone.116  Moreover, 
the Pew Research Center estimates that seventy-four percent of Internet 
users use social networking websites, and around forty percent of 
cellphone owners use social media or social networking sites on their 
phone.117  Encouraging victims to simply turn off their devices or 
computers and log off social networking websites neglects to take into 
account the way most people live. 
Moreover, encouraging victims to simply walk away from their 
smartphones, computers and their social networking websites is only a 
temporary and unrealistic fix to a problem that will not simply “go away” 
for the victims.  It also allows individuals to be further victimized by the 
perpetrator by forcing them to forgo activities they enjoy or benefit 
financially from in order to protect their personal safety.  Instead, actions 
must be taken to protect victims from the devastating effects of 
cyberstalking and online threats. 
C. Heightened Level of Online Threats Against Women 
Women are subject to higher rates of severe online harassment, 
including online threats, compared to men.118  These threats can be made 
by anyone, and women report that the people making these threats are 
anonymous strangers, friends, family members, and ex-romantic 
partners.119  Text messages, email, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, 
Tumblr, and countless other social networking platforms become tools 
utilized to threaten and harass women.  By requiring a mens rea of 
recklessness to convict under § 875(c), prosecutors will have a powerful 
tool to regulate conduct that most adversely affects women. 
In her essay addressing this issue, Amanda Hess explains that, while 
men and women both use the Internet, the majority of threatening and 
harassing online communications target women.120  Hess pointed to a 
study conducted by the University of Maryland in 2006 where researchers 
created fake online accounts to interact with users in chat rooms.121  The 
study found that accounts with female usernames received twenty-five 
 
 116  Cell Phone and Smartphone Ownership Demographics, PEW RES. CTR.,  
http://www.pewinternet.org/data-trend/mobile/cell-phone-and-smartphone-ownership-
demographics/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2015).  
 117  Social Networking Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-
sheets/social-networking-fact-sheet/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2015).  
 118  Duggan, supra note 14, at 3. 
 119  Duggan, supra note 14, at 27. 
 120  Hess, supra note 105. 
 121  Hess, supra note 105; see also Study Finds Female-Name Chat Users Get 25 Times 
More Malicious Messages, A. JAMES CLARK, SCH. OF ENG’G (May 9, 2006), http://www.ece. 
umd.edu/News/news_story.php?id=1788. 
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times more threatening messages than those accounts with male or 
ambiguous names.122  When women experience online harassment and 
threats, much of the harassment is gender-based.123  The gender-based 
threats and harassment women face stem from an extensive history of 
discrimination against women from a society that “promotes male 
privilege by being male dominated, male identified, and male 
centered . . . organized around an obsession with control and . . .  the 
oppression of women.”124  Online threats against women are distinct from 
the type of threats that men may face because the online threats directed 
toward women often target an “individual’s gender in sexually 
threatening and degrading ways,” often in an attempt to control, 
dominate, and silence women.125 
The effects of online threats targeted at women are chilling.  Instead 
of fully participating in society, “Young women are deciding not to 
pursue jobs in technology to avoid the crosshairs of men who don’t think 
they belong.  Women who are being asked to run for public office are 
choosing to stay on the sidelines once they see the online abuse suffered 
by their peers.”126  In short, women are “sacrificing their freedom of 
expression for safety and self-preservation.”127  In a society where three 
women a day will be murdered by someone they know, it is clear that 
online communications that harass and threaten women should be taken 
seriously.128  The Internet has now evolved into an environment where 
online harassment and online threats are an expected reality of women’s 
online experiences.  The law must now evolve as well, and provide a basic 
level of protection for women who are victims of online threats. 
 
 122  Study Finds Female-Name Chat Users Get 25 Times More Malicious Messages, A. 
JAMES CLARK, SCH. OF ENG’G (May 9, 2006), http://www.ece.umd.edu/News/news_story. 
php?id=1788. 
 123  Danielle Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, 
108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 378 (2009) [hereinafter “Law’s Expressive Value”]. 
 124  ALLAN G. JOHNSON, THE GENDER KNOT: UNRAVELING OUR PATRIARCHAL LEGACY 5 
(2007). 
 125  Law’s Expressive Value, supra note 123. 
 126  Katherine Clark, Op-Ed., Sexism in Cyberspace, THE HILL (Mar. 10, 2015), 
http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/235070-sexism-in-cyberspace. 
 127  Id. 
 128  See Kaofeng Lee, Each Day, 3 Women Die Because of Domestic Violence, NAT’L 
NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://nnedv.org/getinvolved/dvam/1307-dvam-
blog-series-1.html.  Additionally, in January 2016 alone, “112 people were killed in suspected 
intimate partner homicides, including children and bystanders.  Men committed 89 percent of 
the alleged fatal attacks, and 77 percent of the victims were women.”  Melissa Jeltsen, This is 
Not a Love Story: America’s Deadly Domestic Violence Problem, THE HUFFINGTON POST 
(2016) http://testkitchen.huffingtonpost.com/this-is-not-a-love-story/. 
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D. Use of Technology to Commit Domestic Violence 
The use of technology to commit domestic violence has become a 
significant problem in the United States as more and more women are 
subject to online stalking and online threats.  Women are at a greater 
overall risk of experiencing stalking than men.129  Often, women are 
exposed to cyberstalking and online threats through domestic violence.130  
The United States Department of Justice defines domestic violence as “a 
pattern of abusive behavior in any relationship that is used by one partner 
to gain or maintain power and control over another intimate partner.”131  
Domestic violence includes “physical, sexual, emotional, economic, or 
psychological actions or threats of actions that influence another person,” 
and includes “any behaviors that intimidate, manipulate, humiliate, 
isolate, frighten, terrorize, coerce, threaten, blame, hurt, injure, or wound 
someone.”132 
In an amicus brief, the National Network to End Domestic Violence 
(“NNEDV”) explained that “these perpetrators are increasingly posting 
to social media with descriptions of what they intend to do to their victims 
and disclosures of personal, damaging, or humiliating information or 
pictures of them.”133  An increasing number of women are experiencing 
domestic violence through cyberstalking and online threats, and the 
“exponential growth of technology and its impact on the way we 
communicate will only increase the incidence of ‘high-tech’ stalking as 
more digitally-native generations mature.”134  In fact, NNEDV  has found 
that batterers often misuse technology to monitor, harass, impersonate, 
and stalk victims.135  NNEDV conducted a survey with victim service 
providers and found that “[t]he top 3 types of technology that abusers 
used to harass survivors were through texting (96%), social media 
accounts (86%), and email (78%).”136  Moreover, NNEDV found that 
around fifty-five percent of abusers post abusive content on social 
 
 129  Baum, Catalano & Rand, supra note 24.  
 130  Law’s Expressive Value, supra note 123. 
 131  Domestic Violence, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/ 
ovw/domestic-violence. 
 132  Id. 
 133  Brief for the Nat’l Network to End Domestic Violence et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 12, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983). 
 134  Id. at 13. 
 135  A Glimpse from the Field: How Abusers are Misusing Technology, NAT’L NETWORK 
TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2014), http://static1.squarespace.com/static/51dc541ce 
4b03ebab8c5c88c/t/54e3d1b6e4b08500fcb455a0/1424216502058/NNEDV_Glimpse+From
+the+Field+-+2014.pdf. 
 136  Id. 
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media.137  In the end, the survey concluded that the widespread use of 
technology is now being used as a tool “that easily facilitates abusers’ 
control.”138  New forms of technology have made it far easier for 
perpetrators of domestic violence to control, manipulate, intimidate, and 
threaten their victims.139  Furthermore, abusers’ misuse of the Internet 
and social networking websites allows them to control and threaten their 
victims without ever having to leave their home.  In one instance, a 
batterer publically announced on his Facebook page what he planned to 
do to his wife, including plans “to hogtie her, put her in a trunk, pull out 
her teeth one by one, then pull off her finger and toe nails, and chop her 
into pieces, but keep her alive long enough to feel all the hurt and pain.”140 
These threats of violence—including online threats—are indicators 
that a woman may experience actual physical violence in the future.141  In 
another instance, one husband sent his estranged wife several text 
messages, including statements that “[s]he better enjoy her last day in the 
motel[.]  Get ready for the shocker” and “Until death do us part bitch.”142  
Months after he sent those text messages, he shot his wife in the head.143  
Many lethality and risk assessment surveys—tools used to determine a 
victim’s risk of being killed by her partner—have highlighted threats of 
violence as a risk factor associated with an increased risk of murder for 
the victim.144  Taken alone, a single threat posted on a social networking 
website or sent through a text message may not rise to a level of 
significant concern.  However, in the context of domestic violence, these 
threats are often followed through with actual physical violence.145  At 
times, this violence can be lethal.146 
 
 
 
 137  Id. 
 138  Id. 
 139  See generally, Brief for the Nat’l Network to End Domestic Violence et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983); 
A Glimpse from the Field: How Abusers are Misusing Technology, supra note 135. 
 140  Brief for the Nat’l Network to End Domestic Violence et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 5, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983). 
 141  Joanne Belknap et. al., The Roles of Phones and Computers in Threatening and 
Abusing Women Victims of Male Intimate Partner Abuse, 19 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 
373, 378 (2012). 
 142  Dickens v. State, 927 A.2d 32, 35 (Md. Spec. App. 2007). 
 143  Id. 
 144  See Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Danger Assessment, JOHNS HOPKINS U., SCH. OF NURSING 
(2004), https://www.dangerassessment.org/DA.aspx. 
 145   Id. 
 146  Dickens, 927 A.2d at 35. 
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IV. STRENGTHENING 18 U.S.C. § 875(C) TO PROTECT VICTIMS OF ONLINE 
THREATS 
While there are different laws that address online threats and 
cyberstalking, § 875(c) specifically makes it a crime to transmit a threat 
to injure a person through interstate communications.147  In the aftermath 
of Elonis v. United States, the Supreme Court left the question of mens 
rea to the lower courts to decide, explaining that, if a person transmits a 
threat with the purpose of issuing a threat or with the knowledge that the 
recipient will view the communication as a threat, the requisite mental 
state for § 875(c) will be satisfied.148  However, the Court did not address 
the question of whether recklessness would be sufficient for conviction 
under § 875(c). 
A. A Requirement of Recklessness Creates a Clearer Standard to 
Prosecute Online Threats 
The Supreme Court has long established that, in situations where a 
federal statute does not expressly state the requisite mental state needed 
to be found guilty of a crime, it is required that a mens rea be read into a 
statute “which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from otherwise 
innocent conduct.”149  In Elonis, the Court explained that the legal 
element that separated innocent conduct from wrongful conduct was “the 
threatening nature of the communication,” therefore, “the mental state 
requirement must . . . apply to the fact that the communication contains a 
threat.”150  While the Court held that the minimum mens rea level of 
negligence—where an actor should be aware of a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk—was not sufficient for conviction under § 875(c), 
reading recklessness into § 875(c) as the requisite mens rea would clearly 
and sufficiently separate innocent conduct from wrongful and criminal 
conduct.151 
 
 147  18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2016). 
 148  Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015).  On remand, the Third Circuit 
upheld Elonis’s conviction, determining that the error in the jury instruction was harmless and 
concluding “beyond a reasonable doubt that Elonis would have been convicted if the jury had 
been properly instructed.”  United States v. Elonis, No. 12-3798, 2016 WL 6310803, at *10 
(3d Cir. Oct. 28, 2016).  The Third Circuit declined to address whether recklessness would be 
sufficient for conviction under § 875(c), noting, “Our disposition on the issue of harmless 
error decides this case.  Accordingly, we have no occasion to determine whether a finding of 
recklessness would be sufficient to satisfy the mental state requirement of § 875(c).  We will 
leave that question for another day.”  Id. 
 149  Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000) (quoting United States v. X-
Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994)). 
 150  Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2011. 
 151  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 General Requirements of Culpability (AM. LAW INST. 
2016). 
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Justice Alito, in his concurrence in Elonis, explained, “[O]nce we 
have passed negligence . . . no further presumptions are defensible . . . 
and when Congress does not specify a mens rea in a criminal statute, we 
have no justification for inferring that anything more than recklessness is 
needed.”152  Moreover, Justice Alito stated that “[t]here can be no real 
dispute that recklessness regarding a risk of serious harm is wrongful 
conduct” and he cited several cases where the Court had described 
reckless conduct as morally culpable.153  For example, in Farmer v. 
Brennan, the Court held that deliberate indifference to inmates harm was 
morally culpable.154  The Court equated deliberate indifference with 
recklessness and held that, while deliberate indifference required 
something more than negligence, “it was satisfied by something less than 
acts for the very purpose of causing the harm, or with knowledge that 
harm will result.”155  In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Garrison v. 
Louisiana, the Court held that civil libel and criminal libel were morally 
culpable when the statement was false and made with reckless disregard 
of whether the statement was true or false.156  Finally, in Tison v. Arizona, 
the Court held that reckless indifference to human life may justify the 
death penalty.157 
A person acts recklessly when “he consciously disregards a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element [of the crime] 
exists or will result from his conduct.”158  Moreover, “the risk must be of 
such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the 
actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard 
involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding 
person would observe in the actor’s situation.”159  In the context of 
cyberstalking and online threats, whether or not a person actually knows 
that someone will view the communications as a threat should not matter.  
Criminal culpability should attach when the person who is 
communicating a threat is aware of a risk that someone will view the 
statement as a threat, chooses to deliberately disregard that risk, and 
proceeds to communicate the threat anyway.  With a requirement of 
recklessness, the government will have to show that the actor was aware 
 
 152  Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2015 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 153  Id. 
 154  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 
 155  Id. at 835. 
 156  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964); Garrison v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964). 
 157  Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987). 
 158  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 General Requirements of Culpability (AM. LAW INST. 
2016). 
 159  Id. 
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of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his words may be received as 
threats and that the actor consciously disregarded that risk, rather than 
prove what the actor actually intended his words to be.  As such, 
recklessness allows for a clear distinction between innocent conduct and 
the wrongful conduct that engenders fear in victims. 
A heightened mens rea requirement of purpose or knowledge would 
serve only to hurt victims of online threats who would inevitably have to 
deal with the harmful aftermath of the threats.  True threats were 
prohibited to protect “individuals from the fear of violence and the 
disruption that fear engenders, as well as from the possibility that the 
threatened violence will occur.”160  Requiring a mens rea of purpose or 
knowledge in § 875(c) would be “dangerously underinclusive” in future 
threat prosecutions and would undermine the protections that a 
prohibition on threats affords victims.161  Moreover, requiring knowledge 
or purpose does not protect against the harms that these threats cause, but 
rather it “effectively decriminalize[s] conduct that predictably and 
reasonably creates a genuine fear of violence with all its attendant 
psychological, emotional, economic, and social disruptions.”162 
With a knowledge or purpose standard, it would be much more 
difficult to convict under § 875(c).  Often, it may be difficult or 
impossible to prove what is going on inside an actor’s mind.  It can be 
hard to understand exactly why someone chose the words they did in 
conveying a message that contained a threat.  Whatever private reasons a 
speaker has for “expressing himself in the way that he did - whether he 
really meant to convey a threat or instead had other undisclosed reasons 
for making the statement in question - are never directly accessible to his 
audience.”163  Despite these undisclosed reasons, the negative effect on 
the victims remains the same, and “some people may experience a 
therapeutic or cathartic benefit only if they know their words will cause 
harm.”164  A threat to kill or harm another individual still causes fear and 
disruption for that person and ultimately has a detrimental effect on that 
individual’s life.165 
Moreover, if § 875(c) requires a mens rea of purpose or knowledge 
 
 160  Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003). 
 161  Brief for the Nat’l Network to End Domestic Violence et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 28, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 162  Id. at 35. 
 163  Id. at 30-31. 
 164  Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2016 (2015). 
 165  Brief for the Nat’l Network to End Domestic Violence et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 17-25, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-
983). 
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to secure a conviction, a defendant could potentially avoid liability and 
conviction by claiming “he was voluntarily intoxicated, or had some 
other form of diminished capacity that he claims prevented him from 
forming the requisite intent, when he made the threats.”166  Additionally, 
a defendant may argue that he was not communicating a threat, but 
instead was simply engaging in therapeutic venting.167  This argument is 
not new, and in State v. Slide, after threatening a judge, the defendant 
argued that a jury could have “reasonable doubt as to whether it might 
have been intended simply as artistic emotional venting.”168 
Finally, like Elonis, a defendant may claim that a communication is 
not a threat, but instead is a creative song or poem.  In U.S. v. Heineman, 
the defendant e-mailed a “poem” which resulted in making the recipient 
fearful for his life.169  Whether it is a poem, a song, therapeutic venting, 
or a drunken threat, the words still convey a threat to the intended target, 
and the victims of these threats still suffer as a result of the threat.  In 
Elonis, Elonis should have been aware that his ex-wife would view the 
statements as a threat, and yet he still posted his threatening “songs” and 
“therapeutic rants” on his Facebook page.170  Under a recklessness 
standard, that alone would have been enough to convict him.  However, 
requiring a mens rea of knowledge or purpose would significantly limit 
the type of threats that can be criminally prosecuted under § 875(c), 
which would severely diminish the available protections for victims of 
online threats and online stalking. 
B. A Requirement of Recklessness Will Protect Individuals from 
Online Threats 
Misunderstandings through online or text message communications 
are common.  When we speak to a person face-to-face, we are better able 
to interpret the meaning of what they say through tone, facial expressions, 
body language, and pacing.171  A sentence can sound friendly in one 
instance and menacing the next, depending on the body language and tone 
of the speaker.  In online communications, readers are unable to see facial 
expressions or body language and are unable to hear the speaker’s tone 
or pace.  In fact, “we tend to misinterpret positive . . .  messages as more 
 
 166  Brief for Appellee at 33, United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d 
and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). 
 167  Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2016 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 168  Brief for Appellee at 33, United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d 
and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).  
 169  U.S. v. Heineman, 767 F.3d 970 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 170  Transcript of Record at 232, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).   
 171  Daniel Goleman, E-Mail is Easy to Write (and to Misread), N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/07/jobs/07pre.html?_r=0. 
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neutral, and neutral ones as more negative, than the sender intended.  
Even jokes are rated as less funny by recipients than by senders.”172 
One way people have attempted to remedy this issue is through the 
use of emoticons or emojis.173  For example, Anthony Elonis claimed that 
a Facebook post in which he advocated matricide against his wife was 
made in “jest,” as he followed the threat with an emoticon of a face with 
a tongue sticking out.174  While emoticons can be seen as an attempt to 
address the problem of determining what a speaker means in an online 
communication, they are not an adequate solution.  In 2011, a University 
of Michigan law student alerted authorities that a fellow classmate had 
been harassing and stalking her; he had sent intimidating text messages 
about her to her friends.175  One threatening text message included an 
emoji of a face with a tongue sticking out, and again, similar to Elonis, 
the perpetrator suggested that the emoji indicated the text message was 
meant to be taken as a joke.176  The judge, however, explained that “the 
inclusion of the emoticon, a ‘-D,’ which appears to be a wide open-mouth 
smile, would not help [the perpetrator].  It does not materially alter the 
meaning of the text message.”177  Moreover, a linguistics scholar has 
noted that certain emoticons, such as a face with a tongue sticking out 
and a “winky” face, are harder to interpret than a smiling or frowning 
face.178  “Research has shown that the wink and the tongue are often used 
to denote teasing or flirting, and interpreting the subtext of those activities 
requires the reader to understand the power dynamics between texter and 
recipient.  Depending on the context, the emoticons can read as either 
creepy or cute.”179 
 
 172  Id. 
 173  Merriam-Webster’s dictionary defines an emoticon as “a group of keyboard characters 
that are used to represent a facial expression (such as a smile or frown).”  Emoticon, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY (2015).  An emoji is “is a graphic symbol, ideogram, that 
represents not only facial expressions, but also concepts and ideas, such as celebration, 
weather, vehicles and buildings, food and drink, animals and plants, or emotions, feelings, 
and activities.”  Petra Kralj Novak, Jasmina Smailovi´c, Borut Sluban & Igor Mozeti, 
Sentiment of Emojis, JOˇZEF STEFAN INST. (2015), http://arxiv.org 
/pdf/1509.07761v2.pdf. 
 174  Brief for Petitioner at 20, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983). 
 175  Enjaian v. Schlissel, 14-CV-13297, 2015 WL 3408805, at *2 n.10 (E.D. Mich. May 
27, 2015). 
 176  Id. 
 177  Id. 
 178  Amanda Hess, Exhibit A: ;), SLATE (Oct. 26, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles 
/technology/users/2015/10/emoticons_and_emojis_as_evidence_in_court.2.html; see 
generally Tyler Schnoebelen, Do you Smile with your Nose? Stylistic Variation in Twitter 
Emoticons, U. OF PENN. WORKING PAPERS IN LINGUISTICS (2012), http://repository.upenn. 
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1242&context=pwpl. 
 179  Hess, supra note 178. 
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When reading a Facebook post or a text message, two people can 
read the same message and understand very different meanings behind it.  
The NNEDV has outlined several factors that should be taken into 
account in determining the context of an online threat.180  These factors 
include how the words are likely to be understood; whether a reasonable 
person would interpret the words as threatening, given the identities of 
the speaker and the listener; the nature of the speaker and the listener; and 
how the words are communicated.181  The NNEDV explains that “victims 
are often the best assessors of the risk that the threats of violence they 
face will be carried out.”182  Understanding the context of the messages 
will allow law enforcement and prosecutors to discover a simple 
message’s hidden meaning.  A recklessness standard in § 875(c) would 
allow for a careful review of context in online threat situations and would 
allow courts to protect victims accordingly.  While context can still be 
ascertained under a purpose or knowledge standard, context in a reckless 
standard is even more crucial, as it lessens the likelihood of pretextual 
defenses that an online threat was intended as a joke or as a means of 
creative expression. 
For example, for the women targeted during the GamerGate 
controversy, a recklessness standard would have permitted prosecutors to 
prosecute the individuals who harassed and stalked the women under § 
875(c).183  Though the women often did not know the identity of their 
online stalkers, these individuals knew the women’s home addresses and 
personal information. Moreover, many of the victims knew that the 
stalkers had knowledge of their home addresses and personal 
information, and had begun receiving death threats at their homes.  An 
individual who communicated a threat to physically injure any of these 
women, and was aware that the women may view the communication as 
a threat, but disregarded that risk and communicated that threat anyway, 
acted recklessly and should be subject to criminal culpability under § 
875(c). 
Additionally, in the context of domestic violence, threats “are 
inevitably interpreted in light of that history and against the backdrop of 
an ever-present awareness of the correlation between threats of violence 
and the likelihood the threats will one day be carried out.”184  Interpreting 
 
 180  Brief for the Nat’l Network to End Domestic Violence, et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 19, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983). 
 181  Id. 
 182  Id. at n.34. 
 183  See supra Part III.B. 
 184  Brief for the Nat’l Network to End Domestic Violence et al as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 19, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983). 
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a threat from an online post can only be determined through the context 
of the threat’s words and the “audience’s shared understandings and 
expectations of what particular words mean when they are used in a 
particular way, in a particular context.”185  For example, in Elonis, Elonis 
posted the threatening speech to his Facebook page after his wife had 
gotten a civil protection order.186  When Tara interpreted Elonis’ words, 
there was “no way [for Tara] to hear if there’s laughter in his voice . . . 
[b]ut we know he’s angry, he’s been fired from his job, he’s been known 
to sexually harass women.  When we don’t have physical cues, it makes 
the threat more frightening.”187  Elonis could have reasonably foreseen 
Tara’s reaction because his threatening speech was an attempt “to get 
inside her head and make her think there could be someone doing 
violence to her.”188  In fact, “Elonis’ threats must be understood in an 
environment where 40% to 50% of murdered women are killed by people 
they know well.”189  As such, a recklessness standard would allow a court 
to view the threat in light of the context of the threat and discover its 
veiled and hidden meanings.  Through strengthening § 875(c) with a mens 
rea of recklessness, prosecutors would have a stronger tool to protect 
victims of domestic violence from further violence at the hands of 
batterers.  Batterers are highly aware of the effects their words have on 
their victims, and, when they choose to threaten their victims, they are 
consciously disregarding the risk that their words may be perceived as a 
threat.  With a mens rea of recklessness, the batterer’s threats alone would 
be enough to bring prosecutions against the batterer.  This would allow 
law enforcement and prosecutors to intervene before the batterer actually 
carried out the threat, preventing a potentially deadly and devastating 
outcome. 
C.  Additional Efforts to Fight Online Threats 
While a recklessness standard under § 875(c) is needed to strengthen 
the already existing federal threat statute, it is only a single step in a much 
larger movement.  There is still much more that needs to be done to fully 
protect victims of online threats and harassment.  On February 10, 2016, 
 
 185  Id. 
 186  Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2006. 
 187  Jessica Valenti, Free Speech is a Bad Excuse for Online Creeps to Threaten Rape and 
Murder, THE GUARDIAN (June 18, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ 
2014/jun/18/free-speech-online-creeps-cyberbullying-laws. 
 188  Nina Totenberg, Is a Threat Posted on Facebook Really a Threat?, NPR (Dec. 1, 
2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/12/01/366534452/is-a-threat-posted-on-facebook- 
really-a-threat. 
 189  Soraya Chemaly & Mary Anne Franks, Supreme Court may have made Online Abuse 
Easier, TIME (June 3, 2015), http://time.com/3903908/supreme-court-elonis-free-speech/. 
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Zoe Quinn announced that she would no longer be pressing charges 
against her ex-boyfriend who aided in her online harassment.190  In a blog 
entry explaining her decision, she wrote, “[T]he criminal justice system 
is meant to punish, not protect . . . And they’ve done nothing to protect 
me - it’s only made things worse and become another weapon in his 
arsenal, and the arsenal of the people out there way scarier than him.”191  
Realizing that the justice system was failing to protect her, and women 
like her, Zoe Quinn created the Crash Override Network, a community 
dedicated to helping individuals who are the targets of online harassments 
and threats through providing public resources, private casework, and 
institutional outreach.192 
Though efforts by non-profits can help victims of online threats, 
social networking websites also need to acknowledge the severity of 
online threats on their respective platforms.  These websites often harbor 
online threats and a stronger response is required by these website owners 
to offer more protection to their users.  Fortunately, some websites are 
beginning to recognize the role they play in the occurrence of online 
threats.  On February 9, 2016, Twitter announced the creation of the 
“Trust and Safety Council” to help fight online abuse, including behavior 
“intended to harass, intimidate, or use fear to silence another user’s 
voice.”193  The Council is comprised of over forty organizations and is 
intended to create policies that will create a safer environment on 
Twitter.194 
Congress has also responded to the prevalence of online threats 
through proposed legislation.  On March 15, 2016, Congresswoman 
Katherine Clark introduced a new federal bill, called the Cybercrime 
Enforcement Training Assistance Act of 2016.195  The Cybercrime 
Enforcement Training Assistance Act would establish federal grants to 
train law enforcement personnel, prosecutors, and judges to identify and 
investigate cybercrimes with the goal of protecting victims of 
 
 190  Zoe Quinn, Why I just Dropped the Harassment Charges the Man who Started 
Gamergate., TUMBLR (Feb. 10, 2016), http://blog.unburntwitch.com/post/ 
139084743809/why-i-just-dropped-the-harassment-charges-the-man.  
 191  Id.  
 192  How Can We Help?, CRASH OVERRIDE NETWORK, http://www.crashoverride 
network.com/about.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2016).  
 193   Patricia Cartes, Announcing the Twitter Trust & Safety Council, TWITTER (Feb. 9, 
2016), https://blog.twitter.com/2016/announcing-the-twitter-trust-safety-council;  
Trust and Safety Council, TWITTER, https://about.twitter.com/safety/council (last visited Mar. 
13, 2016).  
 194  Supra note 193. 
 195  Cybercrime Enforcement Training Assistance Act of 2016, H.R. 4740, 114th Cong. 
(2016). 
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cybercrimes.196  The bill would also establish federal grants to train law 
enforcement personnel, prosecutors, and judges to enforce the existing 
laws that already prohibit cybercrimes.197  In a column published by The 
Hill, Congresswoman Clark explained that the bill is an effort to address 
all of the types of intense online abuse faced by women, from domestic 
violence victims to journalists, noting that “[w]e must not allow the 
Internet to be closed to female voices, and intensifying the enforcement 
of existing law is a critical first step to ensure the Internet is open to 
everyone.”198 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The online community has proven itself to be an unwelcoming 
environment for many.  The economic, emotional, and psychological 
effects of online harassment are widespread and devastating.  While 
online harassment and online threats affect many people, they 
disproportionally impact women and other vulnerable communities.199  
Despite a growing awareness, the online community is still a place where 
many people, from strangers to ex-romantic partners, feel that they can 
attack, threaten, harass, and stalk people, often women, without any 
consequences and with impunity.  However, through strengthening the 
already existing federal threat statute, law enforcement and prosecutors 
can begin to combat these online threats.  With a required mens rea of 
recklessness to convict under the federal threat statute, 18 U.S.C. § 
875(c), an individual can be held criminally liable for threatening a 
person when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that his words may be received as threats.  Individuals who utilize online 
communications to threaten others will no longer be able to hide behind 
justifications of their Internet anonymity, or their assertion that the 
communications were simply “jokes,” “artistic expression,” or 
“therapeutic rants.”  Instead, by imposing a mens rea requirement of 
recklessness under § 875(c), law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges 
will be enabled to offer greater protections for these victims.  With these 
efforts, victims of online threats will finally be able to hold perpetrators 
of online harassment and threats accountable for their actions. 
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